We propose and study the secrecy cooperative MIMO architecture to enable and to improve the secrecy transmissions between clusters of mobile devices in presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. The cooperative MIMO is formed by temporarily activating clusters of the nearby trusted devices, with each cluster being centrally coordinated by its corresponding cluster head. We assume that the transmitters apply a practical eigen-direction precoding scheme and that the eavesdropper has multiple possible locations in the proximity of the legitimate devices. We first obtain the expression of the secrecy rate, where the required ergodic mutual information between the transmit cluster and the eavesdropper is characterized by closedform approximations. The proposed approximations are accurate, and are especially useful for the secrecy rate maximization in terms of the computational complexity. The secrecy rate maximization is then recast into the difference convex programming, which can be solved by an iterative outer approximation algorithm. Numerical results show that the achievable secrecy rate can be effectively improved by activating at least the number of trusted devices as compared to the number of antennas at the eavesdropper.
and Alice has CSITs of both channels, authors in [18] show that the capacity-achieving transmitter scheme is beamforming. The beamforming direction is chosen as the generalized eigenvector corresponding to the maximum generalized eigenvalue of the main and the wiretap channels.
When Bob is also equipped with multiple antennas, the conditions of a full rank and a rank deficient input covariance matrix are proved in [19] . In [20] and [21] , the structures of the optimal input covariance matrix are characterized for general multi-antenna wiretap channels. The closedform expression of the optimal input is given in [22] when the input covariance matrix is full rank, and is given in [23] when it is either full rank or of rank-one.
In the context of secrecy communications, the eavesdropper is usually passive and silent.
Therefore, it is more practical to assume only the statistical, rather than the full knowledge, of the CSIT of the eavesdropping channel. In this case, the secrecy capacity is usually pursued under the weak secrecy constraint, and much fewer results are available, compared to the full CSIT counterpart case. The optimal transmitter can be only characterized for certain channel configurations. Assuming statistical CSIT of the eavesdropping channel, [24] provides a sufficient condition for the optimal input covariance matrix being rank-one, when Alice has multiple antennas, while both Bob and Eve have single receive antenna. In the same setting, authors in [25] derive the closed-form expressions for the optimal input covariance matrix, where the artificial noise is injected and optimized. The optimal rank-one input covariance matrix has been also identified in [26] when Eve is equipped with multiple receive antennas and an on-off power allocation scheme is proposed in [27] to maximize the secrecy rate. When the statistical CSITs of both channels are available and Bob has more receive antennas compared to Eve, authors in [28] show that the optimal input covariance matrix is an identity matrix with uniform power allocation across the transmit antennas. However, when the instantaneous CSIT of the main channel and the statistical CSIT of the eavesdropping channel are available, the capacity-achieving transmitter design is still unknown for generic antenna configurations.
Alternatively, the secrecy rate maximization, assuming statistical CSIT of the eavesdropping channel with the weak secrecy constraint, has been done by approximating the ergodic rate between Alice and Eve, which leads to simplified optimization problem. In [29] , the ergodic mutual information between Alice and Eve is upper-bounded by an equivalent deterministic channel and the optimal precoding has the same direction as the generalized eigenvector of the wiretapped channels. In [30] , the ergodic rate is lower-bounded with a simplified analytical expression and the upper bound of secrecy rate is obtained by assuming linear precoding at the transmitter. By approximating the ergodic rate of Eve with its Taylor series expansion, the nonconvex secrecy rate maximization reduces to a convex problem [31] . In [12] , assuming multiple distributed transmitters, the secrecy rate maximization is converted to a max-min problem using results from the Random Matrix Theory and solved by iterative block coordinate descent algorithm. However, the techniques used in [12] and [29] [30] [31] are relevant to the MIMO channels with co-located antenna arrays or a single distributed antenna array, and cannot be applied to the MIMO channels with distributed antennas at both Alice and Bob, as we assumed in this paper.
B. Physical-Layer Security of Cooperative MIMO
In our recent work [32] , we studied a mobile cooperative MIMO architecture, which is also termed as the Reconfigurable Distributed MIMO (RD-MIMO). Therein, a group of nearby mobile nodes forms a node cluster to jointly transmit or receive wireless signals. The cluster is coordinated by a head node and the coordination signaling is exchanged within the cluster via local wireless connections. When two clusters communicate with each other, and the head node of each cluster jointly encodes or decodes the communicated symbols, the distributed antenna arrays resemble the D-MIMO system. In this work, we consider the physical-layer security of the communications between two clusters of legitimate nodes, each collectively called Alice and Bob, respectively. The inter-cluster transmissions are wiretapped by a multi-antenna eavesdropper. As will be discussed in the following sections, the cooperative MIMO framework improves the secrecy rate both effectively and flexibly. On one hand, compared to the secured transmissions between two single devices, the spatial degrees of freedom between the clusters are increased, which can be utilized in designing the secrecy transmission. In particular, the distributed antenna configuration further increases the secrecy rate by leveraging the macro diversity. On the other hand, the node cluster can be formed on demand and the number of nodes in the cluster can be determined according to the needed performance requirement.
We summarize the contributions of applying the physical-layer security in the cooperative MIMO framework:
• We assume Eve may appear at a finite but arbitrary number of possible locations in the proximity of Alice. The eavesdropper keeps silent and Alice only has the statistical CSITs of the eavesdropper's channels corresponding to each of the possible locations. This system model can be used to evaluate the minimum achievable secrecy rate of the cooperative MIMO, where the locations of Eve are loosely restricted without specifying a known location. For example, Eve may be separated from Alice with at least a certain minimum distance.
• We consider eigen-direction precoding ( [9] ) to construct the input covariance matrix, which leads to low complexity optimization and a simpler transceiver design. Accordingly, we derive approximations for the ergodic rate between Alice and Eve under the eigen-direction precoding. Numerical results show that the proposed approximations are reasonably accurate and provide over-estimates for the exact ergodic rate with a large probability. This is relevant in the context of physical-layer security in order to fulfill the secrecy constraint. Compared to the exact ergodic rate expressions, the proposed approximations have low computational complexity and are especially useful in the iterative secrecy rate maximization.
• The secrecy rate maximization, assuming a number of possible locations of Eve, is recast into the canonical form of the Difference Convex (DC) programming. We solve this nonconvex problem with an iterative outer approximation algorithm, which achieves the global optimal solution. Numerical results show that by enabling more legitimate nodes to form the cooperative clusters, significant secrecy rate can be achieved even when Eve is closer to Alice. On the other hand, when Eve has more receive antennas compared to Alice and Bob, using a more dispersive node distribution can eliminate the null spot with zero secrecy rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the signal model of cooperative MIMO wiretap channels and outlines the eigen-direction precoding scheme. In Section III, we derive approximations for the ergodic rate between Alice and Eve using eigendirection precoding. Numerical results are illustrated to validate the accuracy of the proposed approximations. In Section IV, we present the secrecy rate maximization framework and the related numerical results. In Section V, we conclude the findings of this paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a pair of legitimate transmit and receive nodes, between which the communicated information is sent over the wireless channel and prone to be eavesdropped by a malicious listener, as shown in Fig. 1 . In circular areas with radius and centering at each transmit/receive node, we assume there exist clusters of − 1 and − 1 assisting trusted transmit and receive nodes, respectively. The transmit cluster (around the transmit node, referred to as the head transmit node)
is collectively referred to as Alice. The receive cluster (around the receive node, referred to as the head receive node) is collectively referred to as Bob. All the legitimate and trusted nodes are equipped with a single antenna, while the malicious listener is equipped with an antenna array of antenna elements. In typical communication systems, the eavesdropper is silent and the legitimate nodes cannot detect its presence. However, in certain scenarios, it is relevant to assume that the locations of the eavesdropper are restricted to possible locations, and that the communication between the legitimate nodes can be configured according to the prior knowledge of such possible locations. As an example, Fig. 1 shows the possible locations of the eavesdropper, when a minimum distance min is imposed between the head transmit node and the eavesdropper.
Using a similar distributed cooperative MIMO framework (RD-MIMIO) as discussed in [32] , the transmit nodes forms a cooperative transmit cluster, where the head node is responsible for encoding the information symbols into transmit signals, distributes the encoded signals to the cluster nodes, and synchronizes the transmissions within the cluster. Similarly, the receive nodes form the cooperative receive cluster, in which the receive head node collects the received signals from its assisting nodes and jointly decodes the receive symbols. In this work, we assume that the node cooperation within each cluster is performed over high-speed local wireless connections, while the transmissions between clusters have much lower rate due to longer distance and more severe channel impairments. Therefore, the inter-cluster transmissions are the bottleneck of the system, and the channels between Alice and Bob resemble the distributed MIMO channels.
In addition, we focus on the physical layer security of the inter-cluster communication, where the communication between Alice and Bob in the presence of Eve is modeled by the MIMO wiretap channel [20] . On the other hand, we assume the security of the intra-cluster communication within
Alice and Bob can be guaranteed relatively easily, because the communication links have shorter range and have higher channel capacity.
A. Signal Model
Given a transmit vector = [ 1 , … , ] T , where denotes the transmit signal of the ℎ transmit node in Alice, the vector = [ 1 , … , ] T denotes the receive signals at Bob, and = [ ,1 , … , , ] T , = 1, … , , denotes the receive signals at Eve when Eve is at the ℎ location:
where is the number of possible locations of Eve, and , are the receive signal of the 
Here, (≥ 2) is the path-loss exponent, PL( ) = − is the average channel gain between two nodes at distance , where is the path loss at unit distance, and = PL( ) denotes the average channel gain between the head nodes of Alice and Bob. 
where , is the distance between the ℎ node of Alice and the ℎ location of Eve, and = PL( ) denotes the average channel gain between the head node of Alice and Eve. The additive noise at Bob and at Eve are modeled as i.i.d. complex Gaussian vectors with powers 0 , i.e., ~( , 0 ) and ~( , 0 ).
In this work, we adopt the following assumptions for the signal-level model: The statistical CSI of relies on the distance dependent path loss and the number of available antennas at Eve, which is acquired from prior knowledge. For example, there may exist a maximum number of antenna max that Eve can be equipped with and a minimum distance min between the head node of Alice and Eve. By setting = max , the secrecy rate between the legitimate nodes for all possible location of Eve can be evaluated. The achievable secrecy rate and a practical precoding scheme are discussed in the next subsection.
B. Secrecy Rate and Precoder Design
The considered wiretap channel model with multiple possible locations of Eve is equivalent to the non-colluding multiple eavesdroppers model [33] , where each eavesdropper independently overhears and decodes the confidential message. That is, we can alternatively model the system as if there are identical Eves, one located at each of the possible locations 1 to . The information leakage due to non-colluding multiple eavesdroppers is determined by the maximum mutual information between Alice and each individual Eve. When only the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper channels are known by Alice, the secrecy rate is given by [3] as:
where [ ] + = max(0, ) and denotes the total maximum power radiated by the nodes in the transmit cluster. In (5), ( ) is the instantaneous rate between Alice and Bob, and ̅ , ( ) is the ergodic rate between Alice and Eve at the ℎ location, such that:
where the expectation in (7) is taken over the distribution of the channel .
The secrecy rate maximization problem (5) requires optimizing over the Hermitian covariance matrix , which involves a parametric space with 2 degrees of freedom. To reduce the optimization complexity and simplify the transceiver design, we adopt the eigen-direction precoding [9] , where the covariance matrix is constructed by the eigenvectors of the main channel and a -dimensional power loading vector, so as to reduce the dimension of the parametric space to . Specifically, by using the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD), the channel can be rewritten as
where the × matrix 0 and the × matrix 1 are unitary, and is an × rectangular diagonal matrix with the diagonal entries , = , 1 ≤ ≤ min( , ), being the non-zero eigenvalues of † . The transmitted signal is constructed by the matrix 1 and the diagonal power loading matrix , such that
where ∈ ℂ ×1 are the transmit symbols with normalized power, i.e., [ † ] = . The ℎ diagonal entry of , , denotes the fraction of total power allocated by the ℎ transmit nodes and satisfies 0 ≤ tr( ) ≤ 1. Substituting (8), (9) into (6) and (7), the rates ( ) and ̅ , ( ) become ( ) and ̅ , ( ), respectively, as
where = / 0 and = / 0 denote the average SNR received by Bob and Eve, respectively. Note that ̅ , ( ) depends on the channel matrix via the precoding matrix 1 , which is fixed when evaluating average information leakage from Alice to Eve, see (7) . Therefore, the optimization problem (5) can be reduced to a relatively simpler and sub-optimal problem of finding the optimal power loading matrix , i.e.,
We will derive in Section III approximations for the ergodic rate ̅ , ( ) under different channel settings, and present an optimization framework in Section IV to obtain the global optimal solution of the secrecy rate maximization problem (12) .
Although the precoding structure (9) is heuristic and is not optimal due to the reduction in the degrees of freedom, it is a reasonable scheme and leads to low-complexity transceiver design.
First, we note that under the same channel knowledge assumption, the eigen-direction precoding achieves global optimal when Bob and Eve are equipped with single antenna [24] , and has been also adopted in other multi-antenna communication systems such as [9] and [34] . Second, by multiplying the receive signal with the unitary matrix 0 † , the received signals are decomposed into orthogonal parallel data streams with amplitudes proportional to , 1 ≤ ≤ min( , ), and therefore, simplifying the receiver design.
III. ERGODIC RATE OF EIGEN-DIRECTION PRECODING
In this section, we present analytical approximations for the ergodic rate ̅ , ( ) between Alice and Eve, given a certain power loading matrix . Compared to the exact expression for the ergodic rate ̅ , ( ) , the proposed approximate expressions have lower computational complexity and therefore, are more suitable for the power optimization framework to be presented in Section IV. Under some typical system settings of the RD-MIMO, we also present examples of numerical results to illustrate the approximation error incurred by using the proposed approximation. Results show that the proposed approximations provide reasonably accurate estimation for the ergodic rate ̅ , ( ), where the approximate expression, statistically, overestimate the exact ergodic rate by 0 to 0.8 nats/s/Hz with a large probability. This is a favorable property in the context of the physical-layer security as it provides the lower bound of the secrecy rate and avoids the legitimate transmitters from sending the information with higher rate than the actual secrecy rate. For notational simplicity, we drop the dependency on the power loading matrix and the location index from the ergodic rate ̅ , ( ), whenever it is clear from the context.
A. Ergodic Rate Between Alice and Eve
Given a certain power loading matrix , the ergodic rate ̅ in (11) To address this issue, we propose approximations for the ergodic rate ̅ , which directly depend on the power loading matrix . In specific, consider the quantity ̅ constructed as follows:
where = , and the expectation is taken over both and the Haar random unitary matrix ∈ ( ). We denote ( ) as the unitary group containing all × unitary matrices [36] .
Comparing (13) with (11), we replace the fixed unitary matrix 1 in (11) with the random unitary matrix and apply the Jensen's inequality for the concave log det function. Intuitively, when the path-loss matrix is close to an identity matrix, the unitary matrix 1 or commutes with and can be absorbed into the unitary invariant matrix . The quantity ̅ then becomes the strict upper bound of the ergodic rate ̅ . We will also show in the numerical results that ̅ can serve as an accurate approximation for ̅ , under typical settings of the RD-MIMO systems.
In the following proposition, we present the expression of ̅ when the number of transmit nodes at Alice is less or equal to the number of receive antennas at Eve, i.e., ≥ . We denote 
where , , 1 ≤ , ≤ , is given by Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.
Note that the generalized hypergeometric function with + parameters admits the series representation,
where ( ) = Γ( + )/Γ( ). Therefore, (− ) = 0 for ≥ + 1, and (15) reduces to a finite summation
Since the gamma function Γ( + 1) = ! for non-negative integer , the expression (14) only involves elementary computations and can be easily evaluated.
In the next proposition, we present the expression of ̅ when the number of transmit nodes at Alice is larger than the number of receive antennas at Eve, i.e., > .
Proposition 2.
Consider a particular power loading with 1 , … , > 0 and +1 = ⋯ = = 0, where = and 0 < ≤ . When > ≥ , the closed-form expression of ̅ is given by
where ℬ , , 1 ≤ , ≤ , is given by
When ≥ ≥ , ̅ is given by
where , , 1 ≤ , ≤ + − , is given by
The Proof: The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in Appendix B.
The expressions (14), (16) , and (18) can be used to compute ̅ when the power loading matrix is rank deficient, i.e., < . The rank deficiency of may be due to the power optimization process when Alice does not allocate power to certain eigen-channels, so as to reduce information leaks towards Eve. As an example, when the number of nodes in Bob is less than the nodes in Alice, i.e., when < , the main channel has null space with dimension − .
The rank of the optimal is at most , since otherwise transmitting information over the null space of does not contribute to the secrecy rate.
B. Examples of Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present numerical results to validate the approximation ̅ for the ergodic rate ̅ , where ̅ is calculated by (14) when ≤ , and by (16) and (18) when >
. In specific, we illustrate the variation range of ̅ in Fig. 2 (a) Note that under the weak secrecy constraint, the information leakage ̅ is calculated in (11) by averaging the channel coefficients between Alice and Eve, while giving a certain sample of the channel , i.e., a fixed 1 . The range of ̅ is then compared with the corresponding ̅ . In 
IV. TRANSMIT POWER OPTIMIZATION

A. Difference Convex Programming
Although the rates and ̅ , given by (10) and (11), are concave functions with respect to the power loading matrix , the secrecy rate maximization (12) 
where , ∈ ℝ , and the functions ℎ, are convex.
In the next proposition, we show that the secrecy rate maximization (12) is equivalent to the canonical form of the DC programming (21) . intersects the boundary ∂ , i.e., ( ( )) = 0. Since (⋅) is convex, ( ) can be uniquely obtained by an univariate convex minimization min{1 − : 0 < < 1,
We note that the outer point can be trivially found as = [ 1 , … , 
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we investigate the impacts of the number of cooperative legitimate nodes and the geographical size of the cooperative cluster on the achievable secrecy rate sec . The secrecy rate is obtained by using the Algorithm 1, where the ergodic rate ̅ is approximated by (14) when ≤ , and approximated by (16) and (18) when > . As a comparison, we also obtain the corresponding secrecy rate by searching over all the possible power loading matrix satisfying the constraint 0 ≤ tr( ) ≤ 1.
In Fig. 3 , we assume that there exist more legitimate nodes in each cluster compared to the number of antennas at Eve, i.e., < min( , ). The secrecy rate sec is plotted as a function of the radius of the Alice and Bob clusters, where the distance between the head nodes is fixed to = 10 meters. We choose 10 possible locations of Eve, which are uniformly placed on a circle with radius and centering at the head node of Alice, as shown in Fig. 1 . We assume there are = 4 legitimate transmit nodes, = 4 and 6 legitimate receive nodes, and Eve has = 2 receive antennas. In this channel configuration, it is observed in Fig. 3 that significant secrecy rate can be achieved even when < . This advantageous secrecy rate is achieved due to the degree-of-freedom advantage of the legitimate nodes as opposed to the eavesdropper. As the cluster radius increases, the legitimate nodes are distributed more dispersively within their corresponding clusters, and thus, could reduce the distance between some of the legitimate transmitters and receivers. Due to this reason, the secrecy rate improves as the radius increases, which is especially visible when = 10 meters. It is noted that although Bob with = 6
receive nodes achieves higher secrecy rate, as the radius increases, the rate improvement is less significant compared to the case = 4. It is due to the fact that the additional receive nodes are located further from Alice (e.g., the rightmost node of Bob in Fig. 1 ). Increasing the cluster radius also increases the distance between these nodes and the nodes in Alice, which results in smaller secrecy rate improvement. In Fig. 4 , we compare the achievable secrecy rate when Eve has equal or more antennas compared to the minimum number of legitimate nodes at Alice and Bob, i.e., ≥ min( , ).
Specifically, we assume that there are = 4 nodes at Alice, = 2, 4, or 6 nodes at Bob, and = 4 or 6 antenna elements at Eve. In these settings, when the distances and are equal and = 2, i.e., the legitimate receiver has inferior capability in terms of the number of antennas, only marginal secrecy rate can be obtained when the cluster radius is small. By increasing the cluster radius, positive secrecy rate can be obtained and the rate is proportional to the radius . By increasing the number of nodes at Bob from 2 to 6, we obtain about 1.5 nats/s/Hz rate improvement when = 4 and 1 nats/s/Hz rate improvement when = 6. On the other hand, the secrecy rate can be improved more effectively when = 15 meters, i.e., when the legitimate receiver has distance advantage. In this case, there is a drastic improvement in the secrecy rate by increasing both the cluster radius and the number of nodes at Bob, where the achieved secrecy rates are 3-8 nats/s/Hz when = 4 and 2-7 nats/s/Hz when = 6. In addition, results in Fig. 3 and 4 show that the secrecy rates obtained by using the iterative outer approximation algorithm are very close to those obtained by searching over the power allocation space.
V. CONCLUSIONS
As the small footprint mobile devices can be only equipped with limited number of antenna, the secrecy communications between such devices is difficult to realize when the eavesdropper has more antennas and experiences superior SNR. The proposed secrecy cooperative MIMO architecture resolves this issue by temporally activating nearby trusted mobile devices to form cooperative cluster and jointly transmit or receive confidential message, where the communications between clusters resemble a distributed MIMO system. The secrecy cooperative MIMO architecture aims to enable and improve the secrecy transmissions, by activating a sufficiently large number of trusted devices and shortening the average distance between the legitimate transceivers.
To analyze the achieved secrecy rate, the eigen-direction precoding is applied to construct the input signal and the secrecy rate is obtained, when the eavesdropper may be located at some arbitrary number of possible representative locations. By using Random Matrix Theory, we obtain accurate approximations for the ergodic rate between Alice and Eve, where computational complexity of the proposed approximations are less than the exact ergodic rate available in literature. Therefore, they can be efficiently calculated and useful in the secrecy rate maximization framework.
The maximization of the secrecy rate, against multiple possible locations of Eve, is recast into In the following, we will denote {ℳ , } =1,…, =1,…, as a × matrix block with the row and column indexes running from 1 to a and from 1 to b, respectively. The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the following lemmas, which will be also repeatedly used throughout this paper.
Lemma 1 (l'Hôpital's rule [35] ). Consider the ratio of determinants of the form
where the row index and the column index run from 1 to and the vector = [ 1 , … , ]. When +1 , … , approach zero, the limit of the ratio is given by
where ( ) ( ) denotes the ℎ derivative of ( ), and ( ) = ∏ ( − ) 1≤ < ≤ denotes the Vandermonde determinant parameterized by the first elements 1 , … , .
Lemma 2 (Generalized Andréief integral [39] ). Consider the integral
where the functions (⋅) and (⋅) are such that the integral is convergent. Then, the following identity holds:
Consider the quantity
where is an arbitrary real number. Indeed, by definition, ( ) is known as the Moment Generating Function (MGF) of the random variable log det( + † † ) and the desired quantity ̅ can be obtained as ̅ = log (1). Using the matrix determinant lemma and the definition = 1/2 , ( ) can be rewritten as
The matrix is complex Gaussian distributed with the density
Inserting (27) into (26) and applying the change-of-variables = 1/2 , we obtain
where ℳ( , ) denotes the space of × complex matrices, denotes the normalized Haar measure on the unitary group ( ) , and defines the measure =
. The denominator of (28) normalizes the right-hand-side of (28).
In the next step, we apply the eigenvalue decomposition † = † with the Jacobian given by [40] 
where
We first solve the integral ℐ 1 ( , ) by assuming all the diagonal elements of being non-zero, i.e., = . The general result with 0 < < is obtained by taking the limit +1 , … , → 0.
By using the integral identity [41, Eq. (3.21)], ℐ 1 ( , ) can be solved as
where the row index and the column index in the determinant of (31) run from 1 to . Using Lemma 1, ℐ 1 ( , ) is obtained, with ≥ ≥ , by letting +1 , … , → 0 as
Therefore, the integral ℐ 1 ( , ) is independent of the matrix , i.e., ℐ 1 ( ) ≡ ℐ 1 ( , ), which can be pulled out of the integral over ∈ ( ) in (29) . The integration over , denoted as
, can be solved by the Harish-Chandra-Itzykson-Zuber integral formula [42] as follows
Moreover, the denominator in (29) is a Selberg integral [43, Eq. (17.6.5)] and solved as
Inserting (32)-(34) into (29), we obtain 
where , ( ) = −1 when 1 ≤ ≤ − , and , ( ) = 0 2 ( − + 1,1 − − ; − − + ) when − + 1 ≤ ≤ . We complete the proof by setting ̅ = log (1).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
By following the same procedures as in (26)-(29), we obtain ( ) as
where ℐ 1 ( , ) is given in (30 (37) . By the generalized binomial expansion, we have
where we assume | | < 1 to guarantee the convergence. We will later on extend this expression to arbitrary values of . Inserting (38) into (32), we obtain .
Note that the representation using the Meijer's G-function can be analytically continued to arbitrary values of . Again, we notice that the integral ℐ 1 ( , ) ≡ ℐ 1 ( ) is independent of the matrix and can be pulled out of the integral over ∈ ( ) in (37) .
When ≥ , the integral ℐ 2 ( ) = ∫ exp(−tr † −1 ) ( ) is obtained by applying Lemma 1 to (33) to take the limit +1 , … , → 0. That is, 
Inserting ℐ 1 ( ), ℐ 2 ( ), and (40) 
where the second equality is obtained by applying Lemma 2 and the integral formula for the Meijer's G-function [44] .
When ≥ ≥ , we obtain ( ) as , where we applied Lemma 2 in the second equality. We complete the proof by setting ̅ = log (1).
APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
The secrecy rate maximization problem (12) can be rewritten as follows: 
where the power loading matrix satisfies tr( ) ≤ 1. The inner optimization in (42) 
≤ 0, tr( ) ≤ 1.
The inequality constraint (43) is equivalent to the following system of inequalities:
where is an auxiliary variable. Since the maximum of a finite set of convex functions is also convex [38] , the functions ℎ( ) = max{ + ( ), tr( ) − 1, } and ( ) = + + ( ) are convex. By letting = [0, … ,0,1] T and = [ 1 , … , , , ] T , we obtained the canonical form of DC programming as defined in (21) .
